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EFFECTS ON THE GROUND: 
SOCIAL UPHEAVAL OR NET 
SOCIETAL BENEFITS? 
 
 
Unsafe Loans in a Deregulated 
U.S. Mortgage Market 
 
Vincent Di Lorenzo* 
  
This Article explores actual market outcomes in a 
deregulated mortgage market to ascertain if market discipline 
can be relied upon to ensure safe and sound loan products.  In 
3DUW , RI WKLV DUWLFOH WKH EDQN UHJXODWRUV· GHFLVLRQV WR
deregulate the mortgage market are set forth.  In Part II, the 
outcomes generated by such a legal environment are presented.  
Such outcomes reveal steadily increasing availability and 
acceptance of risky loan products, resulting in equity stripping 
due to subsequent defaults.  In Part III of the article, an 
alternative regulatory approach is offered³one that imposes a 
minimum required level of safety for all loan products. 
 
I.  Regulatory Reliance on Market Discipline 
 
In 1982, Congress lifted statutory requirements for 
mortgage loans originated by federally chartered banks and 
thrifts.1  Titles III and IV of the Garn-­St. Germain Act replaced 
requirements such as maximum loan-­to-­value ´/79µ ratios 
with a general authorization to make real estate loans subject 
to the restrictions and requirements that federal banking 
                                                          
  *  PURIHVVRU RI /DZ DQG 6HQLRU )HOORZ 9LQFHQWLDQ &HQWHU 6W -RKQ·V
University.  Copyright © 2009 by Vincent Di Lorenzo. 
1. Garn-­St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-­
320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).  
1
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regulators may prescribe.2  Most state legislatures followed the 
lead of the Congress, either by also lifting rigid statutory 
requirements or by relying on state wild-­card statutes to 
achieve the same result.3  In addition, Title VIII of the Garn-­St. 
Germain Act allowed non-­federally chartered housing creditors 
to offer alternative mortgage instruments to the same extent 
authorized by federal regulators.4 
After Congress lifted rigid statutory constraints on 
mortgage lending by banks and thrifts in 1982, the regulators 
were faced with three possible options as the new form of 
mortgage market regulation.  The Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency summarized its options in 1983 as follows: 
 
1. Adopt a regulation that reaffirms the 
limitations that existed under 12 U.S.C. 371 
before the 1982 amendment . . . 
2. Adopt a regulation that modifies the 
limitations that existed under 12 U.S.C. 371 
before the 1982 amendment and currently exist 
in the interpretive rulings. 
3. Adopt a regulation that imposes no limitations 
RQ QDWLRQDO EDQNV· UHDO HVWDWH OHQGLQJ DQG
rescinds current regulations which do impose 
limitations.5 
 
It chose the third option.  The Comptroller justified this 
GHFLVLRQLQWKHIROORZLQJWHUPV´7KH2IILFHEHOLHYHVWKDWDVLGH
from the regulations, factors such as market forces and 
management philosophies are the rHDOGHWHUPLQDQWVRIEDQNV·
real estate lending practices. . . . [D]ecisions concerning the 
forms and terms of national bank lending are properly the 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\ RI HDFK EDQN·V GLUHFWRUDWH DQG PDQDJHPHQWµ6  
Similarly, after initially proposing to retain some regulatory 
requirements such as LTV ratios, the Federal Home Loan 
                                                          
2. Id. §§ 322, 403, 96 Stat. 1469, 1499, 1510-­11 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 
371(a), 1464(c)(1)(B)). 
3. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 103(4) (McKinney 2009). 
4. § 804, 96 Stat. at 1546-­47 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3803). 
5. Real Estate Lending by National Banks, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,698, 40,699 
(Sept. 9, 1983) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7). 
6. Id. at 40,699-­700. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/17
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Bank Board removed most regulatory requirements for real 
estate loans except for two³a loan could not exceed 100 
percent of the appraised value of the real estate, and a home 
loan could not have a maximum term longer than 40 years.7  
By 1996, even these limited requirements were lifted.  In 1996 
WKH862IILFH RI 7KULIW 6XSHUYLVLRQ ´276µ DV VXFFHVVRU WR
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, embraced the same, 
largely free-­market, approach that was earlier embraced by the 
Comptroller of the Currency.8  At that time, it converted its 
HDUOLHUUHJXODWLRQVLQWR´KDQGERRNJXLGDQFHµ9 
In response to the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act,10 the federal regulators were 
forFHGWR´DGRSWXQLIRUPUHJXODWLRQVSUHVFULELQJVWDQGDUGVµIRU
real estate lending by insured depository institutions.11  The 
regulators made two decisions that confirmed their preference 
for a free-­market approach to the extent governing statutes 
would permiW 7KH ILUVWGHFLVLRQZDV WR LVVXH´JXLGHOLQHVµ IRU
real estate lending, rather than impose regulations setting 
minimum requirements for real estate lending operations for 
all banks and thrifts.12 
The second decision that the regulators made after the 
1991 Act was to employ a principles approach in their 
guidelines, rather than requiring or prohibiting particular 
practices.  While initially proposing specific LTV ratio limits, 
for example, the agencies ultimately adopted a principles 
approach³listing general principles VXFK DV ´SUXGHQWµ
underwriting that should guide bank management in 
authorizing specific loan products and practices.13  This was a 
                                                          
7. Implementation of New Powers;; Limitation on Loans to One 
Borrower, 48 Fed. Reg. 23,032, 23,035-­37 (May 23, 1983) (stating that for 
KRPH ORDQV LQ H[FHVV RI QLQHW\ SHUFHQW RI WKH SURSHUW\·V DSSUDLVHG YDOXH
private mortgage insurance was required for the part of the loan balance that 
exceeded eighty percent of the value). 
8. See Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951, 50,952-­53 (Sept. 30, 
1996) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 545, 556, 560, 563, 566, 571, 590). 
9. Id. at 50,952. 
10. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-­242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(o)(1) (2006). 
12. See infra note 13 and accompanying text. 
13. Real Estate Lending Standards, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,890, 62,893, 62,897 
(Dec. 31, 1992) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 34, 208, 365, 545, 563). 
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free-­market approach to the extent the 1991 Act would permit 
it.  The 1992 agency standards relied on bank management to 
determine permitted products and practices.  They required 
that banks and thrifts establish and maintain written internal 
real estate lending policies which were consistent with safe and 
sound banking practices, including prudent underwriting 
standards.14 
Abusive practices again surfaced after the 1992 and 1996 
revisions to the real estate lending standards.  Between 1999 
and 2001, the federal bank regulatory agencies issued three 
guidances on real estate lending.  The first concerned subprime 
lending, and it was motivated by actions of insured depository 
institutions, who were increasingly originating subprime loans 
to increase their profits³loans which exhibited significantly 
higher risks of default than traditional bank lending.15  The 
second concerned high LTV residential real estate lending, and 
its publication was motivated by the fact that insured 
depository institutions were increasingly originating 
residential real estate loans in amounts exceeding eighty 
percent of appraised value in order to increase their profits³
which created great risks of default and severe losses 
associated with such loans.16  The third was an Expanded 
Guidance on Subprime Lending, and it was motivated, again, 
by the higher risks inherent in subprime lending programs, as 
well as, for the first time, by recognition that some forms of 
subprime lending may be abusive or predatory.17  Despite 
recognition of the emergence of risky loan products, all three 
´JXLGDQFHVµ FRQWLQXHG WR UHO\ RQ EDQN PDQDJHPHQW WR VHW
                                                          
14. Id. at 62,897.  The guidelines did contain LTV ratios for different 
types of real estate loans.  See id. at 62,891-­93.  However, even the guidelines 
specified no LTV limits for mortgages on owner-­occupied one-­to-­four family 
residential property and for home equity loans.  Id. at 62,893.  Other 
requirements, such as maximum maturity limits, amortization requirements, 
and documentation requirements, were rejected.  See 57 Fed. Reg. 36,911, 
36,912 (proposed Aug. 17, 1992). 
15. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., FDIC 
INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE (Mar. 1, 1999), 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/1999/FIL9920a.html. 
16. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ET AL., INTERAGENCY 
GUIDANCE ON HIGH LTV RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE LENDING 1-­2 (1999), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/1999/FIL9994.pdf. 
17. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., 
Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs (Jan. 31, 2001), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2001/pr0901a.html. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/17
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policies to control the risks inherent in subprime and high LTV 
lending programs, and to avoid possible violations of consumer 
protection laws.18 
,Q -DQXDU\  WKH &RPSWUROOHU·V 2IILFH GLG ILQDOO\
prohibit loans made without regard to ability to repay.19  This 
is the only regulatory prohibition that a federal agency has 
issued regarding real estate lending standards.  The timing is 
revealing because it was done at the same time and in the 
same regulation that preempted state predatory lending laws.20 
Thus, the net effect was to impose far fewer prohibitions on 
                                                          
18. See, for example, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., 
supra note 15, which stated that: 
 
Institutions should recognize the additional risks 
inherent in subprime lending and determine if these risks 
DUHDFFHSWDEOHDQGFRQWUROODEOHJLYHQWKHLQVWLWXWLRQ·VVWDII
financial condition, size, and level of capital support.  
Institutions that engage in subprime lending in any 
significant way should have board-­approved policies and 
procedures, as well as internal controls that identify, 
measure, monitor, and control these additional risks. 
 
It also provided, with respect to consumer compliance issues, that: 
 
Institutions that originate or purchase subprime loans must 
take special care to avoid violating fair lending and 
consumer protection laws and regulations.  Higher fees and 
interest rates combined with compensation incentives can 
IRVWHU SUHGDWRU\ SULFLQJ RU GLVFULPLQDWRU\ ´VWHHULQJµ RI
borrowers to subprime products for reasons other than the 
ERUURZHU·V XQGHUO\LQJ FUHGLWZRUWKLQHVV  $Q DGHTXDWH
compliance management program must identify, monitor 
and control the consumer protection hazards associated 
with subprime lending. 
 
Id. 
19. Bank Activities and Operations;; Real Estate Lending and 
Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1950 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 
7, 34) (enacting a prohibition that applies to national banks and their 
operating subsidiaries). 
20. See id. at 1906, 1908, 1913-­14.  Community and consumer advocates 
expressed concern that preemption would expose consumers to widespread 
predatory and abusive practices by national banks.  Id. at 1906.  The 
&RPSWUROOHU·V 2IILFH KRZHYHU ZDV FRQFHUQHG DERXW WKH FRVWV DQG EXUGHQV
that state predatory lending laws imposed on national banks, id. at 1908, and 
concluded that enforcement actions under federal law, such as the Federal 
Trade Commissions Act of 1914, § 5, 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) (2000), can ensure fair 
treatment of consumers, id. at 1913-­14. 
5
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possible abusive lending practices by national banks. 
There is one final point regarding the regulatory viewpoint 
WKDW VKRXOG EH QRWHG  $OO RI WKH DJHQFLHV· JXLGDQFHV DSSOLHG
only to the banks or thrifts themselves and their operating 
subsidiaries.  They did not apply to mortgage affiliates of these 
institutions.  This failure to extend the regulatory guidance to 
bank and thrift affiliates was not explainable by a lack of 
supervisory power over mortgage affiliates.  This was 
demonstrated by the fact that in 2006, the agencies again 
issued new guidelines on real estate lending and, for the first 
time, imposed some of those guidelines on bank and thrift 
affiliates.21 
7KH DJHQFLHV· ODVW UHYLVLRQV RI WKHLU XQLIRUm real estate 
lending standards came in 2006 and 2007.  An interagency 
guidance on nontraditional mortgage products was issued in 
October 2006.22  The guidance was motivated by the increased 
offering of loans that allowed borrowers to defer payment of 
principal and, sometimes, interest (i.e., interest-­only and 
payment-­option adjustable rate mortgages), as well as by 
reduced documentation requirements.23  The guidance 
continued to rely on bank management to decide the policies 
and products that would serve to minimize risks to the banks 
and thrifts.24  It made only two changes to its earlier, complete 
reliance on bank management and narrow scope of coverage.  
First, it cautioned banks to include an evaluation of the 
ERUURZHU·V DELOLW\ WR UHSD\ WKH GHEW DW ILQDOmaturity at the 
fully indexed rate, assuming a fully amortizing repayment 
schedule.25  It also advised banks to demonstrate mitigating 
factors supporting the underwriting decision in the event of 
risk layering, such as reduced documentation loans.26  Second, 
for the first time, the agencies applied the guidance to bank 
and thrift affiliates.27 
While the agencies recognized the consumer protection 
issues raised by many product offerings, they continued to rely 
                                                          
21. See Notice, Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage 
Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609 (Oct. 4, 2006). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 58,609. 
24. Id. at 58,615. 
25. Id. at 58,614. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 58,616. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/17
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on disclosure to address such concerns.28  Thus, a largely free-­
market approach continued to be favored with bank 
management determining the appropriate policies to employ, 
and products to offer, and consumers determining the risks 
such products pose. 
The last interagency guidance on real estate lending was 
issued in July 2007.  It was motivated by concern over the 
increasing use of adjustable rate mortgage products with low 
initial payments based on an introductory rate that expires 
after a short period.29  The final guidance also applies to bank 
and thrift affiliates.30 
The 2007 guidance reiterates the principles that were 
announced in the earlier guidances dating back to 1993.31  In 
addition, it includes a statement that prudent underwriting 
VWDQGDUGV´VKRXOGLQFOXGHDQHYDOXDWLRQRIDERUURZHU·VDELOLW\
WR UHSD\ WKH GHEW E\ >WKH ORDQ·V@ ILQDO PDWXULW\ DW WKH IXOO\
indexed rate, assuming a fully amortizing repayment 
VFKHGXOHµ32  The guidance does not prohibit stated income and 
reduced documentation loans, but cautioned that such loans 
should be made to subprime borrowers only if there are 
                                                          
28. See id. at ´0RUHWKDQWUDGLWLRQDO>DGMXVWDEOHUDWHPRUWJDJHV
´$50Vµ@ PRUWJDJH SURGXFWV VXFK DV SD\PHQW-­option ARMs and interest-­
only mortgages can carry a significant risk of payment shock and negative 
amortization that may not be fully understood by conVXPHUVµId. at 58,616.  
´&RPPXQLFDWLRQ VKRXOG KHOS PLQLPL]H SRWHQWLDO FRQVXPHU FRQIXVLRQ DQG
complaints, foster good customer relations, and reduce legal and other risks 
WRWKHLQVWLWXWLRQµ  Id. at 58,617.  See also Notice, Interagency Guidance on 
Nontraditional Mortgage Products, 70 Fed. Reg. 77,249, 77,255 (proposed 
'HFVWDWLQJWKDW´,QVWLWXWLRQVVKRXOGDOVRHQVXUHWKDWFRQVXPHUV
have information that is timely and sufficient for making a sound product 
selection GHFLVLRQµ 
29. Notice, Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 
37,569, 37,572 (July 10, 2007).  The agencies stated their concern that: 
 
[T]hese products, typically offered to subprime borrowers, 
present heightened risks to lenders and borrowers.  Often, 
these products have additional characteristics that increase 
risk.  These include qualifying borrowers based on limited 
or no documentation of income or imposing substantial 
prepayment penalties or prepayment penalties that extend 
beyond the initial fixed interest period. 
 
Id. at 37,569. 
30. See id. at 37,570. 
31. See id. at 37,573. 
32. Id. 
7
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mitigating factors, such as substantial liquid reserves or 
assets.33 
With respect to consumer protection concerns, apart from 
cautioning that loan underwriting should consider the 
ERUURZHU·V DELOLW\ WR UHSD\ GLVFORVXUH ZDV RQFH DJDLQ UHOLHG
upon to protect consumers in the final 2007 interagency 
guidance.34 
In summary, after the lifting of statutory requirements for 
mortgage loans in 1982, regulatory requirements were lifted as 
well.  The federal regulators relied on bank management to 
ensure sound operations, and on consumers to protect 
themselves against abusive loan practices.  The only loan 
products that were actually prohibited in the period from 1983 
to 2007 were loans made without regard to the ability to repay, 
and even this prohibition was embraced only by the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and only for national banks and 
their subsidiaries³not for bank affiliates.  Other regulators 
merely cautioned banks and thrifts, through regulatory 
´JXLGDQFHVµ against making loans without regard to the 
ERUURZHU·V ability to repay.  Thus, from 1982 to 2007, the 
UHJXODWRU\DJHQFLHV·GRPLQDQWYLHZSRLQWZDV a reliance on free-­
market forces. 
 
II.  Expected Versus Actual Outcomes in a Deregulated 
Environment 
 
In lifting rigid statutory requirements in 1982, Congress 
had two immediate purposes in mind: (1) to ensure an 
adequate supply of credit for home mortgage transactions by 
                                                          
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 37,572.  The guidance also noted that: 
 
Fundamental consumer protection principles relevant to the underwriting 
and marketing of mortgage loans include: 
 
 $SSURYLQJ ORDQV EDVHG RQ WKH ERUURZHU·V DELOLW\ WR UHSD\ WKH ORDQ
according to its terms;; and 
 Providing information that enables consumers to understand 
material terms, costs, and risks of loan products at a time that will 
help the consumer select a product. 
 
Id. at 37,574.  These were the only two principles announced. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/17
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allowing more creative and flexible financing, and (2) to allow 
banks and thrifts to become stronger participants in the home 
financing market.35 
However, these immediate purposes must be understood as 
qualified by the long-­standing federal policy of ensuring the 
safety and soundness of bank and thrift institutions.36  In 
addition, these immediate purposes must also be understood in 
the context of a series of enactments that occurred in 1974,37 
1988,38 and 1994,39 all of which were aimed at eliminating 
abusive practices in the residential real estate lending process. 
Thus, &RQJUHVV·V legislative enactments over the entire 
1974 to 1994 period reveal a desire to achieve three outcomes: 
(1) to ensure an adequate supply of credit for home mortgage 
loans, (2) to ensure that such loans are provided in a safe and 
sound manner by banks and thrifts, among other institutions, 
and (3) to ensure that such loans do not contain terms and are 
not offered through practices that are potentially abusive 
toward consumers.  As discussed in Part I of this Article, the 
means that the regulators embraced to achieve these goals 
relied upon market discipline rather than regulatory 
restriction. 
 
                                                          
35. See S. REP. NO. 97-­536, at 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3054, 3081. 
36. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2006 & Supp. 2008) (stating that failure 
to conduct safe and sound operations is a basis for regulatory sanctions);; 12 
U.S.C. § 1831p-­1 (2006) (detailing the safety and soundness standards). 
37. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-­
533, 88 Stat. 3164 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-­2616 (2006)).  
7KH $FW ZDV DLPHG DW HOLPLQDWLQJ ´>D@EXVLYH DQG XQUHDVRQDEOH SUDFWLFHV
ZLWKLQ WKHUHDOHVWDWHVHWWOHPHQWSURFHVVµ S. REP. NO. 93-­866, at 2 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6546, 6547. 
38. See Home Equity Loan Consumer Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-­709, 102 Stat. 4725 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
39. See Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-­325, § 151, 108 Stat. 2160, 2190 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
1601) (aiming to avoid potentially abusive terms in high-­cost mortgages as 
well as instances when lenders act in a predatory fashion by targeting 
unsophisticated, low-­income homeowners).  See also S. REP. NO. 103-­169, at 2, 
22 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1886 (expressing similar 
concerns). 
9
2009] UNSAFE LOANS 163 
A. Expected Outcomes 
 
Regulators expected that market-­based decisions would 
lead to innovative loan products, which would maximize 
availability of credit and which ZHUHDOVR ´VDIHµSURGXFWVDQG
practices.  Lender self-­interest, bounded by the legal mandate 
RI ´VDIHW\ DQG VRXQGQHVVµ ZDV UHOLHG XSRQ WR HQVXUH VDIH
offerings.40  Consumer self-­interest was also relied upon to 
weed out unsafe products and practices.41 
Bank regulators were trained in the economic sciences.  
This expectation was in line with the prevailing view in the 
legal and economic communities.42 
 
B. Actual Outcomes 
 
Did banks and thrifts, as well as the rest of the mortgage 
loan industry, choose to offer only loans that the industry 
FRQVLGHUHG ´VDIH DQG VRXQG"µ  6LPLODUO\ GLG FRQVXPHUV DYRLG
ORDQV WKDW ZHUH ´XQVDIHµ RU ´XQVRXQGµ IURP WKH LQVWLWXWLRQ·V
perspective?  This was the predicted outcome based on a 
reliance on market discipline.  But what was the actual 
outcome? 
 
1.  Unsafe Products and Practices 
 
The most revealing outcome is one that examines the 
mortgage practices of regulated banks and thrifts.  These 
institutions were subject to the general prohibition against 
´XQVDIH DQG XQVRXQGµ EDQNLQJ SUDFWLFHV43 as well as the 
uniform guidelines cautioning against unaffordable loans, 
LQFOXGLQJ ORDQVPDGHZLWKRXW UHJDUG WR WKHERUURZHU·VDELOLW\
to repay.44  If thesHJHQHUDO´FRQVWUDLQWVµFRXSOHGZLWKPDUNHW
                                                          
40. See supra notes 6, 18, 24 and accompanying text. 
41. See supra notes 28, 34 and accompanying text. 
42. This view assumes that every individual is a rational maximizer of 
his self-­interest.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-­4 (7th 
ed. 2007).  See also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 
(1998) (GLVFXVVLQJ*DU\%HFNHU·VDFFRXQWRIXWLOLW\PD[LPL]DWLRQ 
43. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
44. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (the 2001 guidance 
LGHQWLILHGORDQVEDVHGRQWKHERUURZHU·VDVVHWVUDWKHUWKDQDELOLW\WRUHSD\DV
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/17
164 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:154 
discipline did not prevent unsafe lending practices by these 
institutions, then they certainly would not prevent unsafe 
lending practices by non-­affiliated and less-­regulated mortgage 
companies. 
The mortgage products and practices that emerged were: 
(a) adjustable rate mortgages (´ARMsµ) with low initial rates 
that lead to substantial increases in loan payments after the 
H[SLUDWLRQV RI WKH LQLWLDO ´WHDVHUµ UDWHV E SD\PHQW-­option 
loans in which the borrower could choose an amount to pay, 
including a minimum payment that did not include all accrued 
interest, until a recast of the payments at a later point, which 
would significantly increase loan payments;; (c) loans made 
ZLWKRXWUHJDUGWRERUURZHUV·DELOity to repay, including limited-­
documentation or no-­documentation loans;; and (d) loans made 
requiring very little or no borrower equity, including first lien 
mortgage loans that tolerated piggyback loans. 
ARMs introduce the risk of sticker shock after the 
expiration RIORZLQLWLDO´WHDVHUµLQWHUHVWUDWHV45  For example, 
DQ DQDO\VLV RI  VXESULPH $50V LQ  LQGLFDWHG ´DQ
DYHUDJH ¶SD\PHQW VKRFN· RI  SHUFHQW RYHU WKH WHDVHU-­rate 
payment, even if short-­term interest rates remained 
XQFKDQJHGµ46  However, since interest rates increased in 2006, 
the payment shock was estimated to be 50 percent.47  Payment-­
option loans introduce the risk of another form of sticker shock, 
namely an increase in monthly payments upon recast of the 
loan.48  In payment-­option loans, the borrower can choose to 
pay a minimum payment which does not include all accrued 
interest and does not include payment of principal.49  The 
                                                                                                                                  
a potentially abusive lending practice).  See also supra notes 19, 25, 32 and 
accompanying text. 
45. See STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 110TH CONG., SHELTERING 
NEIGHBORHOODS FROM THE SUBPRIME FORECLOSURE STORM 2 (2007), available 
at 
http://jec.senate.gov/archive/Documents/Reports/subprime11apr2007revised.p
df. 
46. Id. 
47. Id.  The figures were based on a 2006 analysis by Fitch Ratings.  Id.  
2/28 ARMs have a low initial interest rate that is in effect during the first two 
years of the loan.  Id. 
48. Bob Tedeschi, 1HZ 5XOHV IRU ´([RWLFµ /RDQV, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 
2006, at J13. 
49. Jay Romano, 3OXVHVDQG0LQXVHVRI2SWLRQ$50·V, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
9, 2005, at L10. 
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accrued and unpaid interest is then added to the principal.50  
However, when the outstanding balance reaches a certain 
threshold³W\SLFDOO\  RI WKH SURSHUW\·V YDOXH³then the 
payment option expires and the loan is recast to require 
monthly payments of both interest and principal.51 
No-­documentation or low-­documentation loans add the risk 
that the lender has no assurance that the borrower is able to 
afford the loan, either initially or after a reset of interest rates 
or recast of payments.  From 2000 to 2005, the number of 
subprime loans made without full documentation of income 
climbed from twenty-­six percent of subprime mortgages in 2000 
to forty-­four percent in 2005.52 
Finally, piggyback loans add the risk that the borrower has 
very little equity in the home.53  In the event of a significant 
decline in the fair market value of the property, refinancing 
becomes difficult or impossible.54  Moreover, the risk of default 
LQFUHDVHVVLQFHWKHERUURZHU·VHTXLW\KDVDOUHDG\EHHQORVWGXH
to the market decline.55  By the end of 2006, thirty-­two percent 
of home purchase borrowers relied on piggyback loans to 
finance their purchases.56 
The widespread offering of these risky loan products was 
documented by research analysts at Credit Suisse.57  Focusing 
on the subprime market at the end of 2006, Credit Suisse found 
WKDW´>U@RXJKO\RIDOOVXESULPHERUURZHUVLQWKHODVWWZR
                                                          
50. Id. 
51. Id. (recast occurs at five years or when the outstanding balance 
exceeds property value by 125 percent). 
52. Wei Li & Keith S. Ernst, Do State Predatory Lending Laws Work?  A 
Panel Analysis of Market Reforms, 18 HOUSING POL·Y DEBATE 347, 361 (2007). 
53. FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, DECLINING CREDIT & 
GROWING DISPARITIES: KEY FINDINGS FROM HMDA 2007, at 2 (2008), available 
at 
http://furmancenter.org/files/KeyFindingsfromHMDA2007FurmanCenterRep
RUWSGI3LJJ\EDFNORDQVDUH´MXQLRUOLHQVLVVXHGWRDKRPHEX\HUDWWKHVDPH
time as a first mortgage to bridge the gap between the purchase price and his 
or hHUILUVWPRUWJDJHµId. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id.  But cf. infra text accompanying note 64 (citing a forty percent 
figure found by Credit Suisse in its sample of loans through the third quarter 
of 2006). 
57. CREDIT SUISSE, MORTGAGE LIQUIDITY DU JOUR: UNDERESTIMATED NO 
MORE (2007), available at http://billcara.com/CS%20Mar%2012%202007% 
20Mortgage%20and%20Housing.pdf. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/17
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years had provided limited documentation regarding their 
LQFRPHVµ58 DQGWKDW´>L@Q$50V>UHVHWWLQJDIWHU
years] represented roughly 78% of all subprime purchase 
originations . . . . [H]ome buyers were primarily qualified at the 
introductory teaser rate rather than the fully amortizing rate . 
µ59 
Focusing on the Alt-­A market at the end of 2006, Credit 
Suisse found that 1) 55% of borrowers in Alt-­A purchase 
originations had taken simultaneous second mortgages, or 
piggybacks, at the time of purchase;;60 ´ORZQRGRFXPHQWDWLRQ
loans . . . represented . . . 81% of total Alt-­A purchase 
RULJLQDWLRQVµ61  ´LQWHUHVW RQO\ DQG RSWLRQ $50 ORDQV
represented approximately 62% of Alt-­A purchase 
RULJLQDWLRQVµ62 DQG´DGGLQJWRWKHULVNLVWKHIDFWWKDW-­year 
hybrid ARMs represented approximately 28% of Alt-­A 
purchase originations . . . setting the stage for considerable 
UHVHWULVNµ63 
Focusing on the overall market for mortgage products, 
&UHGLW 6XLVVH IRXQG WKDW  ´DSSUR[LPDWHO\  RI KRPH
purchase mortgages [made through the third quarter of 2006] 
LQYROYHGSLJJ\EDFNORDQVFRPSDUHGZLWKLQµ64 2) 
DSSUR[LPDWHO\´RIWRWDOSXUFKDVHRULJLQDWLRQVLQZHUH
LQWHUHVW RQO\ RU QHJDWLYH DPRUWL]DWLRQ PRUWJDJHVµ65 and 3) 
´>O@RZQRGRFXPHQWDWLRQORans increased from . . . 18% of total 
SXUFKDVHRULJLQDWLRQVLQWRLQµ66 
A pattern of engaging in risky practices by offering loan 
products that layered risks was evident in the industry 
JHQHUDOO\  )RU H[DPSOH ´>D@ERXW  SHUFHQW RI WKH SD\Pent-­
option ARMs issued from 2004 to 2007 were underwritten 
ZLWKRXWIXOOGRFXPHQWDWLRQRIWKHERUURZHUV·LQFRPHVµ67 
                                                          
58. Id. at 4. 
59. Id. at 5.  The subprime market constituted twenty percent of total 
originations in 2006.  Id. at 4. 
60. Id. at 17-­18. 
61. Id. at 17. 
62. Id. at 36. 
63. Id. at 4.  The Alt-­A market constituted twenty percent of total 
originations in 2006, rising from just five percent in 2002.  Id. 
64. Id. at 5. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Bob Ivry & Linda Shen, Washington Mutual Hobbled by Increasing 
Defaults on Option ARMs, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 15, 2008, 
13
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Not only were individually risky products introduced, but 
there was also a layering of risks.  Payment-­option ARMs are 
especially risky due to a layering of two sets of sticker shock: 
one due to the interest rate reset and another due to the recast 
of payments.  A no-­documentation payment-­option ARM then 
adds a third layer of risk due to an inability to assess 
ERUURZHUV· UHSD\PHQW DELOLW\  ,QGustry surveys reveal that 
banks and thrifts, either directly or through affiliates, became 
primary originators of payment-­option ARMs.68  Vague legal 
FRQVWUDLQWVLQWKHIRUPRI´VDIHW\DQGVRXQGQHVVµUHTXLUHPHQWV
and regulatory guidelines warning against making loans 
without regard to ability to repay did not prevent these 
practices at federally regulated financial institutions.69  
Certainly, market discipline alone would not prevent these 
practices at non-­federally regulated mortgage lenders.  
Beginning in 2005 and continuing into 2007, the mortgage 
industry newsletter, National Mortgage News, periodically 
collected data on residential payment-­option ARM 
originations.70  Such data revealed the following levels of 
participation by banks or thrifts and their affiliates in 
originations of payment-­option ARMs: 
 
                                                                                                                                  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aNSwdt57nTBI. 
68. See infra notes 71-­98 and accompanying text. 
69. Paul Muolo, Option ARMs in Sevenfold Rise, NAT·L MORTGAGE NEWS, 
Dec. 5, 2005, at 1. 
70. Id. (stating that ´>P@RUWJDJH EDQNHUV IXQGHG DOPRVW  ELOOLRQ LQ
payment-­option ARMs in the third quarter [of 2005], a more than sevenfold 
LQFUHDVH IURP WKH VDPH SHULRG ODVW \HDUµ  7KH ILJXUHV UHSRUWHG SD\PHQW-­
option ARM production disclosed to National Mortgage News by lenders.  Id.  
The disclosed figures were estimated to represent approximately sixty 
percent of the payment-­option ARM market.  Id. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/17
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Time Period Market Share ² Residential 
Payment-­Option Loans 
Originated by Banks, Thrifts 
or Affiliates 
Second Quarter 2007 52.39 percent71 
Second Quarter 2006 51.1 percent72 
First Quarter 2006 55.77 percent73 
Fourth Quarter 2005 60.3 percent74 
 
The mortgage practices of four large banks and thrifts³
Countrywide, Washington Mutual, Wachovia and IndyMac³
illustrate the failings of a reliance on vague legal standards 
and market discipline to avoid unsafe mortgage lending 
practices. 
&RXQWU\ZLGHZDVWKHFRXQWU\·VODUJHVWPRUWJDJHOHQGHUDV
of 2008.75  It originated $73 billion in mortgage loans in the 
first quarter of 2008 alone.76  It was also a significant 
originator of subprime mortgages.  By the first quarter of 2007, 
                                                          
71. 5HVLGHQWLDO2SWLRQ$50V/HQGHUVLQ4¶, NAT·L MORTGAGE NEWS, 
Oct. 1, 2007, at 1.  The bank or thrift lenders, or their affiliates, were 
Washington Mutual, Countrywide, Wachovia, IndyMac, Greenpoint 
Mortgage, Mortgage IT (a subsidiary of Deutsche Bank), Flagstar Bank, 1st 
National Bank of Arizona, Downey Savings and Loan, and Sun Trust 
Mortgage.  Id. 
72. 5HVLGHQWLDO2SWLRQ$50/HQGHUVLQ4 ¶, NAT·L MORTGAGE NEWS, 
Sept. 15, 2006, at 1.  The bank or thrift lenders, or their affiliates, were 
Countrywide, Washington Mutual, IndyMac, Greenpoint Mortgage, EMC 
Mortgage (a subsidiary of JP Morgan Chase), Mortgage IT, Downey Savings 
and Loan, 1st National Bank of Arizona, Bank of America, First Horizon, Sun 
Trust Mortgage, and American Mortgage Network (a subsidiary of 
Wachovia).  Id. 
73. 5HVLGHQWLDO2SWLRQ$50/HQGHUVLQ4 ¶, NAT·L MORTGAGE NEWS, 
July 24, 2006 at 1.  The bank or thrift lenders, or their affiliates, were 
Countrywide, EMC Mortgage, IndyMac, Goldenwest Financial, Greenpoint 
Mortgage, Downey Savings & Loan, Mortgage IT, 1st National Bank of 
Arizona, Bank of America, First Horizon, Sun Trust Mortgage, and American 
Mortgage Network.  Id. 
74. 5HVLGHQWLDO2SWLRQ$50/HQGHUVLQ4 ¶, NAT·L MORTGAGE NEWS, 
Mar. 27, 2006, at 1.  The bank or thrift lenders, or their affiliates, were 
Countrywide, EMC Mortgage, IndyMac, Greenpoint Mortgage, Downey 
Savings & Loan, Bank of America, American Mortgage Network, First 
Horizon, Flagstar Bank, and Sun Trust Mortgage.  Id. 
75. Complaint at 9, People v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 08-­CH-­22994 
(Ill. Cir. Ct. June 25, 2008), available at http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral. 
gov/pressroom/2008_06/countrywide_complaint.pdf. 
76. Id. 
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Countrywide had become the largest originator of subprime 
loans with a total subprime loan volume of over $7.8 billion.77 
The evidence that has emerged indicates layering of 
several types of risky loans in the industry generally, as well as 
at Countrywide³namely, ARMs with a payment option, made 
with little or no documentation of income, and requiring little 
money down.  Thus, the Wall Street Journal reported in 2007: 
 
By 2005, option ARMs accounted for $238 
billion of loan volume, or about 8% of loans 
originated that year, according to Inside 
Mortgage Finance, a trade publication.  At 
Countrywide, these loans accounted for $93 
ELOOLRQRURIWKHFRPSDQ\·VORDQYROXPHE\
2005, making it the top option ARM lender that 
year. 
 
. . . . 
 
Of the option ARMs [Countrywide] issued [in 
@  ZHUH ´ORZ-­GRFµ PRUWJDJHV LQ ZKLFK
the borrower GLGQ·W IXOO\ GRFXPHQW LQFRPH RU
assets, according to UBS, compared with an 
industry average of 88% that year.  In 2004, 78% 
RI&RXQWU\ZLGH·V RSWLRQ$50VFDUULHG OHVV WKDQ
full documentation. 
Countrywide also allowed borrowers to put 
down as little as 5% of DKRPH·VSULFHDQGRIIHUHG
´SLJJ\EDFNPRUWJDJHVµZKLFKDOORZERUURZHUVWR
ILQDQFHPRUHWKDQRIDKRPH·VYDOXHZLWKRXW
paying for private mortgage insurance.  By 2006, 
nearly 29% of the option ARMs originated by 
Countrywide and packaged into mortgage 
securities had a combined loan-­to-­value of 90% or 
more, up from just 15% in 2004, according to 
UBS.78 
                                                          
77. Id. at 9-­´>,@Q&RXQWU\ZLGHRULJLQDWHGURXJKO\ELOOLRQLQ
VXESULPHORDQV,QWKDWQXPEHUVKRWXSWRRYHUELOOLRQµId. at 13. 
78. Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, &RXQWU\ZLGH·VNew Scare: ¶2SWLRQ
$50·'HOLQTXHQFLHV%OHHGInto Profitable Prime Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
24, 2007, at C1. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/17
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Cases brought by State Attorneys General also uncovered 
a pattern of unsafe lending practices at Countrywide.  For 
example, in its lawsuit against Countrywide, the State of 
Illinois filed a complaint that indicated that: 
 
 ´)URPWKURXJKWKHILUVWKDOIof 2007, a majority of 
the Countrywide mortgages sold in Illinois were reduced 
GRFXPHQWDWLRQ ORDQV RIWHQ FDOOHG ¶VWDWHG-­LQFRPH· RU
¶OLDU·VORDQV·µ79 
 ´&RXQWU\ZLGH    EHFDPH D OHDGHU LQ WK>H@ SURILWDEOHµ
Option ARM loan market.80  ´2SWLRQ $50V LQFUHDVHG
fURP DSSUR[LPDWHO\  RI WKH FRPSDQ\·V ORDQ
production during the quarter ended June 30, 2004, to 
approximately 21% of its production during the quarter 
HQGHG-XQHµ81 
 ´2I WKH RSWLRQ $50V &RXQWU\ZLGH VROG LQ  
were reduced documentation mortgages in which the 
ERUURZHUGLGQRWIXOO\GRFXPHQWLQFRPHRUDVVHWVµ82 
 Countrywide offered interest-­only loan products in 
which the interest-­only payment feature existed only 
´GXULQJWKHILUVW\HDUVRIWKHORDQXVXDOO\WKHILUVW
 RU  \HDUVµ83  It EHFDPH ´WKH VHFRQG OHDGLQJ
originator of interest-­only loans from 2006 through the 
VHFRQGTXDUWHURIµ84  :KHQLWTXDOLILHGERUURZHUV·
ability to repay, such qualification was often not at the 
payment due on a fully amortizing mortgage.85  
Countrywide qualified its borrowers at the minimum or 
the lower non-­amortizing interest-­only payment at least 
part of the time during the period 2003 through 2007.86 
 &RXQWU\ZLGH ´DFNQRZOHGJHG LQD0D\  OHWWHU WR
the Office of Thrift Supervision . . . that . . . looking at 
originations in the fourth quarter of 2006, . . . almost 
                                                          
79. Complaint, supra note 75, at 23. 
80. Id. at 35. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 40. 
83. Id. at 29. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 30. 
86. Id. 
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60% of the borrowers who obtained subprime hybrid 
$50VµLQFOXGLQJLQWHUHVWRQO\ORDQVIURP&RXQWU\ZLGH
´ZRXOGQRWKDYHTXDOLILHGDWWKHIXOO\LQGH[HGUDWHµ87 
 
Indeed, Countrywide decided to switch from a national 
bank to a thrift charter in 2006 precisely because the OTS 
applied the interagency guidelines on alternative mortgage 
SURGXFWVZLWK´PRUHUHVWUDLQWµ88 
The system of embracing risky loan practices was equally 
evident at Washington 0XWXDO ´:D0Xµ %HWZHHQDQG
2007, WaMu increasingly originated subprime loans and short-­
term adjustable-­rate mortgages, especially payment-­option 
ARMs.89  ´,Q  DQG  :D0X IXQGHG D WRWDO RI 
billion in payment option adjustable rate mortgages . . . , and, 
by the end of 2007, it held $48 billion in [payment option 
adjustable rate mortgages] that resulted in negative 
DPRUWL]DWLRQ    µ90  ,Q DGGLWLRQ ´LQWR  :D0X
XQGHUZURWH SD\ RSWLRQ $50 ORDQV EDVHG RQ WKH ERUURZHUV·
ability to afforGWKHORZ¶WHDVHU·SD\PHQWµ91  It also increasingly 
originated loans with limited or no documentation of income or 
assets.92 
Wachovia was similarly in the business of making risky 
                                                          
87. Id. DW LQWHUQDOTXRWDWLRQPDUNVRPLWWHG  ,QDGGLWLRQ ´DOPRVW
RIWKHERUURZHUVµIRUVXESULPHK\EULG$50VZKLFKPD\LQFOXGHUHGXFHG
documentation and high loan-­to-­YDOXH UDWLRV ´ZRXOG QRW KDYH TXDOLILHG IRU
any other [Countrywide] SURGXFWµ  Id. at 32-­33 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
88. Barbara A. Rehm, Countrywide to Drop Bank Charter in Favor of 
OTS, AM. BANKER, Nov. 10, 2006, at 1. 
89. Drew Desilver, Is the Sky Falling?  Big Dreams of WaMu Dashed by 
Risky Loans, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at H1.  WaMu made $452.5 
billion in subprime loans, home equity loans, and short-­term adjustable rate 
mortgages between 2004 and the end of 2007.  Id. 
90. MICHAEL HUDSON & JIM OVERTON, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 
THE SECOND S&L SCANDAL 8 (2009), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-­lending/policy-­
legislation/regulators/the-­second-­s-­l-­scandal.pdf (figures collected from 
:D0X·VILOLQJVZLWKWKH6(& 
91. Id. 
92. Desilver, supra note 89.  For example one individual analyzed a 
bundle of loans made by WaMu in May 2007 that consisted of 1,765 loans 
totaling $519 million.  Mark Gimein, ,QVLGHWKH/LDU·V/RDQ, SLATE, Apr. 24, 
2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2189576/.  In this bundle of loans, eighty-­eight 
percent did not request verification of income.  Id.  By March 2008, eighteen 
percent of the loans were in foreclosure.  Id. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/17
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loans in recent years.  It was the largest originator of pay-­
option ARM loans in the second quarter of 2007, followed by 
WaMu, and held $122 billion of such loans.93  The biggest 
originators of such loans at the time were Wachovia, WaMu, 
Countrywide, Downey Financial Corporation (a savings and 
loan), and IndyMac.94  Wachovia was the largest holder of 
option ARMs.95  According to its own website, these mortgages 
represented seventy-­WKUHH SHUFHQW RI :DFKRYLD·V ORDQ
portfolio.96  Indeed, one of the very reasons Wachovia 
purchased Golden West Financial Corporation in 2006 was 
*ROGHQ·V IRFXV RQ RSWLRQ DGMXVWDEOH-­rate mortgages, which it 
hoped to cross-­sell to Wachovia customers.97 
The same practice of making risky loans was uncovered at 
IndyMac.  IndyMac was one of the largest holders of payment-­
option ARM loans.98  In addition, as recently as the first 
quarter of 2007, only twenty-­RQH SHUFHQW RI ,QG\0DF·V WRWDO
loan production was in the form of full-­documentation 
mortgages.99  Finally, some of the loans that IndyMac labeled 
as full-­documentation loans may have been supported, not by 
verification of income, but rather only by verification of 
employment.100 
 
                                                          
93. Ivry & Shen, supra note 67. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Bob Ivry, Wachovia Option-­ARM Mortgage Losses May Force Merger, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 29, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid= 
af4TVTdVFB1s&pid=20601087. 
97. Matthias Rieker, :KDW·V'ULYLQJ/DWHVW'HDOV",W·V1RW&RVWV, AM. 
BANKER, May 15, 2006, at 1. 
98. See Ivry, supra note 96;; Ivry & Shen, supra note 67.  When seized by 
regulators, IndyMac held $3.5 billion of option ARMs, the fifth highest 
amount behind Wachovia, WaMu, Countrywide, and Downey Financial.  Ivry 
& Shen, supra note 67. 
99. MIKE HUDSON, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, INDYMAC: WHAT WENT 
WRONG? 3 (2008), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-­
lending/research-­analysis/indymac_what_went_wrong.pdf.  Figures are based 
on filings with the SEC.  Id. at 3 n.6.  One year later, IndyMac had charged 
this reliance on limited-­ or no-­documentation loans, but by March 2008, sixty-­
nine percent of its loan volume involved full-­documentation mortgages, 
leaving almost one-­third of its loan volume still in the form of limited-­ or no-­
documentation mortgages.  Id. 
100. Id. at 8. 
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2.  Equity Stripping 
 
The greatest loss of equity results from unsafe lending 
practices that lead to foreclosure.  This is a loss faced by 
borrowers not only due to the overly aggressive and unsafe 
lending practices of recent years, but also, to a lesser extent, in 
prior time periods.  Recent foreclosures have come in three 
waves, representing three stages of risk that result from the 
mortgage practices of recent years.  The first wave of 
foreclosures, occurring in 2007 and 2008, resulted from 
adjustable-­rate subprime loans in which borrowers were 
unable to afford the reset interest rates and were unable to 
refinance their mortgages.101  The second wave is expected in 
2009 and 2010, and will result from payment-­option ARMs that 
recast and five-­year adjustable-­rate hybrid ARMs.102  Such 
loans were made in both the subprime and the Alt-­A markets.  
A third wave of foreclosures has actually overlapped with these 
first two causes of financial difficulty.  This resulted from the 
unavailability of credit in the tightened mortgage market in 
late-­2008 and 2009, job losses resulting from a downturn in the 
economy triggered by mortgage loan losses of financial 
institutions, and a sharp drop in housing prices making 
refinancing of a large outstanding mortgage balance 
impossible.103 
Total loans in foreclosure averaged 455,000 annually from 
                                                          
101. See Kelly D. Edmiston & Roger Zalneraitis, Rising Foreclosures in 
the United States: A Perfect Storm, 2007 FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY 
ECON. REV. 115, 130-­32 (2007), available at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/ECONREV/PDF/4q07Edmiston.pdf 
(discussing increases in short-­term interest rates and payment resets on 
nontraditional mortgages being responsible for the increase in foreclosure 
rates on ARMs, especially subprime ARMs);; John Leland, Loans that Looked 
Easy Pose Threats to Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2009, at A12 (discussing 
difficulty of refinancing). 
102. See Leland, supra note 101;; Ruth Simon, The Financial Crisis: 
Loan Delinquencies Rear Their Ugly Head Again, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2008, 
at A3 [hereinafter Simon, The Financial Crisis];; Ruth Simon, FirstFed 
Grapples With Payment³Option Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2008, at A3 
[hereinafter Simon, FirstFed]. 
103. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE 
OF THE NATION·S HOUSING 1-­2 (2009), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2009/son2009.pdf 
(discussing declining housing prices and tightening of the credit market);; 
Simon, The Financial Crisis, supra note 102 (discussing tight lending 
standards and job losses). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/17
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2002 through 2006, and then more than doubled to nearly 
940,000 by the fourth quarter of 2007.104  This was a jump from 
less than one percent of all loans in the earlier period to more 
than two percent by the end of 2007.105  As for subprime loans, 
the foreclosure rate exceeded five percent from 2001 through 
2003, and then again in the first quarter of 2007, and never 
dropped below three percent from 2001 through 2007.106 
Defaults and foreclosures increased in 2008 and continued 
to do so in 2009.  In October 2007, the Joint Economic 
Committee reported that in the 2007-­09 period, subprime 
IRUHFORVXUHV ZRXOG WRWDO WZR PLOOLRQ FDXVLQJ ´ ELOOLRQ LQ
housing wealth [to] be directly destroyed through the process of 
IRUHFORVXUHµDQG DQRWKHU ´ELOOLRQ    LQGLUHFWO\GHVWUR\HG
E\WKHVSLOORYHUHIIHFWRIIRUHFORVXUHVµ107  In fact, the number of 
foreclosure filings has been greater than expected.  Thus, 
during 2008, foreclosure filings actually occurred against 
2,330,483 properties.108  In addition, it was expected that there 
would be 2.4 million new foreclosure filings in 2009.109 
Two troubling characteristics have become apparent 
regarding the incidence of foreclosures in recent years.  First, 
foreclosures are heavily concentrated in low-­income 
communities110 and in communities that are predominantly 
                                                          
104. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 103, 
at 20 (compiling data from the Mortgage Bankers Association). 
105. Id. 
106. DARRYL E. GETTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., UNDERSTANDING 
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE: RECENT EVENTS, THE PROCESS, AND THE COSTS 3 
(2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34232_20071105.pdf.  
The foreclosure rate exceeded seven percent from 2001 through the second 
quarter of 2003.  Id. 
107. STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 110TH CONG., THE SUBPRIME LENDING 
CRISIS 1 (2007), available at http://jec.senate.gov/archive/Documents/ 
Reports/10.25.07OctoberSubprimeReport.pdf (estimating an aggregate 
cumulative subprime foreclosure rate of 18 percent during the 2007-­09 
period). 
108. Press Release, RealtyTrac, Foreclosure Activity Increases 81 
Percent in 2008 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/ 
ContentManagement/PressRelease.aspx?channelid=9&ItemID=5681. 
109. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNITED STATES FORECLOSURES: 
IMPACT & OPPORTUNITIES 1 (2009), available at http:// 
www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-­lending/tools-­resources/factsheets/us-­
foreclosure-­fact-­sheet.pdf.  More than eight million foreclosures are expected 
GXULQJWKHQH[WIRXU\HDUVEDVHGRQ&UHGLW6XLVVHDQDO\VWV·IRUHFDVWVId. at 
1, 2 n.b. 
110. See, e.g., External Effects of Concentrated Mortgage Foreclosures: 
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black or Hispanic.111 
7KHDUJXPHQWWKDWKDVEHHQPDGHLQIDYRURI´LQQRYDWLYHµ
mortgage products is that they increase rates of 
homeownership and thus provide a net societal benefit.112  
Given the high-­risk nature of the products which can, and 
have, led to default and foreclosure for many low-­income and 
minority homeowners, embracing an outcome in which 
YXOQHUDEOHKRPHRZQHUV·substantial losses are deemed justified 
because there is an overall net gain in level of homeownership 
is an ethically troubling viewpoint.  However, the evidence has 
actually revealed that there were no net societal benefits in the 
form of increased levels of homeownership in the long-­term.  
For instance, the Center for RespoQVLEOH /HQGLQJ ´&)5/µ
analyzed the claimed net gain in homeownership resulting 
from subprime lending from 1998 through 2006.113  It 
concluded that: ´Subprime loans made during 1998-­2006 have 
led or will lead to a net loss of homeownership for almost one 
                                                                                                                                  
Evidence from New York City: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Domestic 
Policy, Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 2, 22 
(2008) [hereinafter External Effects] (statement of Vicki Been, Professor of 
Law and Director of New York University Furman Center for Real Estate 
and Urban Policy), available at 
http://domesticpolicy.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080522105505.pdf;; 
Press Release, Jeffrey D. Klein, N.Y. Senator, Klein and Senate Dems Unveil 
Updated Analysis of Sub-­Prime Mortgage Crisis (Aug. 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.nysenate.gov/news/klein-­and-­senate-­dems-­unveil-­updated-­
analysis-­sub-­prime-­mortgage-­crisis.  Professor Been of New York University 
School of Law testified before the House Subcommittee on Domestic Policy 
that: 
 
Foreclosures in New York City are highly concentrated in 
specific neighborhoods. . . . [H]igh-­exposure neighborhoods 
tend to have a greater proportion of black and Hispanic 
residents, lower median incomes, lower median sales prices 
and higher rates of subprime lending than low-­exposure 
neighborhoods. 
 
External Effects, supra, at 4. 
111. External Effects, supra note 110, at 4. 
112. Edmund L. Andrews, Fed and Regulators Shrugged as the 
Subprime Crisis Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at A1 (before this year 
´RIILFLDOVSUDLVHGVXESULPHOHQGHUVIRUKHOSLQJPLOOLRQVRIIDPLOLHVEX\KRPHV
IRUWKHILUVWWLPHµ 
113. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SUBPRIME LENDING: A NET DRAIN 
ON HOMEOWNERSHIP 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-­lending/research-­analysis/Net-­
Drain-­in-­Home-­Ownership.pdf. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/17
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million families.  In fact, a net homeownership loss occurs in 
subprime loans made in every one of the past nine years.µ114 
The data showed that between 1998 and 2006, about 1.4 
million first-­time home buyers used subprime loans to 
purchase their homes, but an HVWLPDWHG´PLOOLRQERUURZHUV
who obtained subprime loans will lose or have already lost 
WKHLU KRPH WR IRUHFORVXUHµ115  The calculations made by the 
CFRL do not take into account the even greater number of 
foreclosures that occurred after 2006. 
The analysis performed by the CFRL focused on subprime 
ORDQV LQ ZKLFK ´LQQRYDWLYHµ DQG ULVN\ ORDQ SURGXFWV DQG
practices prevailed in recent years.  The Joint Center for 
Housing Studies of Harvard University analyzed the effect on 
homeownership rates of all loans.116  It reviewed 
homeownership rates through the end of 2007 and concluded: 
 
The expansion of mortgage credit in the 
1990s was therefore accomplished with 
traditional products and without adding much to 
risk.  The growth in mortgage credit after 2003, 
in contrast, came largely from gains in much 
riskier subprime, interest-­only, and payment-­
option loans.  These novel mortgage products 
provided only a temporary lift to homeownership.  
Indeed, the national homeownership rate peaked 
in 2004 and has since retreated below its 2003 
level. 
For the rate to fall below its 2000 level, the 
number of homeowners would have to dip by 
another million³a real possibility given the 
rising tide of foreclosures.117 
 
This experience demonstrates that safe underwriting 
                                                          
114. Id. 
115. Id.  A majority of the subprime loans that were acquired were for 
refinancing and not for the purchase of a home.  Id. at 3.  Moreover, a 
significant proportion of subprime purchase mortgages are obtained by 
existing homeowners who buy additional homes³not first-­time home 
buyers³and therefore do not increase homeownership levels.  Id. 
116. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 103, 
at 3-­4. 
117. Id. at 4 (internal citation omitted). 
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practices can help to achieve the goal of access to credit and 
expansion of homeownership opportunities.  Mandating such 
practices is the proposal presented below. 
 
III.  An Alternative Approach: Bounded Decision-­Making 
 
In recent years, commentators and even some federal 
regulators have recognized the deficiencies of relying on a 
market-­based decision-­PDNLQJDSSURDFK )URPWKH LQGXVWU\·V
perspective, a vague mandate to avoid unsafe and unsound 
mortgage products and practices often is ignored when the 
originator can generate substantial profits from potentially 
unsafe offerings.118  From the consumer·V perspective, many 
consumers seem unable to judge the safety of mortgage loan 
offerings.119  Thus, an alternative to relying on market-­based 
decisions is necessary.  The alternative I propose is based on 
principles of complexity theory, and is one I have earlier 
advanced in my study of business ethics.120 
As applied to the United States mortgage market, an outer 
legal boundary must be imposed that requires a clear, fixed, 
minimum level of safety for every mortgage loan.  The outer 
boundary of safety proposed as a statutory mandate is twofold.  
First, a maximum LTV ratio for all residential real estate loans 
would be mandatory, and this would include a required equity 
investment by the borrower.  This could be eighty percent, or 
perhaps slightly higher, and would prohibit secondary 
financing and require mortgage insurance if any loan exceeded 
                                                          
118. See generally Vincent Di Lorenzo, Business Ethics: Law as a 
Determinant of Business Conduct, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 275 (2007) (documenting 
case studies of the securities, automobile, pharmaceutical, and mortgage 
banking industries, and drawing the conclusion that a vague legal mandate is 
typically associated with corporate conduct that ignores the legal mandate). 
119. The Federal Reserve Board embraced this conclusion in 2008.  See 
Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,525-­26 (July 30, 2008) (codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 226). 
120. Vincent Di Lorenzo, Does the Law Encourage Unethical Conduct in 
the Securities Industry?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 765, 794-­98 (2006) 
(discussing the legal outer-­ERXQGDU\EDVHGRQFRPSOH[LW\WKHRU\·VSULQFLSOHRI
a strange attractor).  In that research, I focused on the sanctions that can 
shape actual outcomes.  Id. at 797.  In this Article, I focus on the type of legal 
mandate that can assist in shaping those outcomes.  A detailed discussion of 
the concept of a strange attractor as applied to a legislative scheme is found 
in Vincent M. Di Lorenzo, Equal Economic Opportunity: Corporate Social 
Responsibility in the New Millennium, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 51, 80-­84 (2000). 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/17
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eighty percent of value.  It would be mandatory for each 
residential mortgage loan made by a bank, thrift, affiliate of a 
bank or thrift, or any non-­affiliated mortgage lender.  Second, a 
maximum debt-­to-­income ratio would similarly be mandatory.  
This could be thirty-­one percent, or perhaps slightly higher, 
and it would require documentation of income and be 
underwritten at the maximum interest rate permitted under 
the loan, with payments that fully amortize the loan over its 
term. 
In July 2008, the Federal Reserve Board issued new 
regulations, effective October 1, 2009, that apply to a new 
catHJRU\ RI ORDQV FDOOHG ´KLJK-­SULFHG PRUWJDJH ORDQVµ ZKLFK
the regulations define in a manner intended to cover all 
subprime mortgages and most Alt-­A mortgages.121  Under the 
new regulations, lenders are prohibited from making loans 
without regard to borrowerV· DELOLW\ WR UHSD\ DQG they must 
assess that ability based on the highest scheduled payment in 
the first seven years of the loan.122  This new approach 
recognizes the need for a minimum level of safety in mortgage 
transactions.  However, the Federal ReservH %RDUG·V DFWLRQ
differs from my proposal in four important respects.  First, it 
does not apply to all mortgage loans³it applies only to high-­
priced mortgage loans.  Second, it states no clear standard that 
GHILQHVDERUURZHU·V ´DELOLW\WRUHSD\µ 7KHUH Ls no maximum 
debt-­to-­income ratio stipulated, which once again leaves too 
much discretion in the hands of bank management.  Third, it is 
missing the other component of safe underwriting that I have 
proposed³a maximum LTV ratio.123  Finally, the fourth 
difference is that my proposed safety standard is statutory.  
7KHUH LV D ULVN LQ UHO\LQJ RQ WKH )HGHUDO 5HVHUYH %RDUG·V
regulation to avoid a recurrence of unsafe mortgage loans in 
the long-­term.  The Federal Reserve Board issued the 
regulation under its authoriW\ WR GHWHUPLQH ZKLFK ´XQVDIHµ
mortgage practices should be regulated.124  However, the 
                                                          
121. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,522.  A loan is a high-­priced 
mortgage loan if it is a first-­lien mortgage and has an annual percentage rate 
WKDW H[FHHGV E\  SHUFHQWDJH SRLQWV WKH ´DYHUDJH SULPH RIIHU UDWHµ
published by Freddie Mac.  Id. at 44,522-­23. 
122. Id. at 44,523. 
123. See also Edmiston & Zalneraitis, supra note 101, at 130-­32 
(discussing the extra risk of default caused by high loan-­to-­value ratios). 
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2006). 
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)HGHUDO5HVHUYH%RDUG·VYLHZSRLQWKDVDOZD\VEHHQWKDWLWZLOO
intervene in the mortgage market by defining a practice as an 
´XQVDIHµPRUWJDJHSUDFWLFHRQO\ZKHQWKHQHWsocietal costs of 
non-­regulation outweigh its benefits.125  Currently, this is the 
case due to the very high levels of mortgage defaults and the 
serious economic repercussions they have produced.  However, 
when this crisis passes, the Federal Reserve Board might 
UHVFLQG LWV UHJXODWLRQ EHFDXVH LWV ´QHW VRFLHWDO EHQHILWVµ
threshold will no longer demand government intervention.  In 
my view, it is preferable to have a statutory standard of safety 
to avoid that possible regulatory change. 
The required boundaries of safety proposed in this Article 
avoid unfettered individual bank and consumer discretion as to 
what products and SUDFWLFHV DUH ´VDIHµ VLQFH H[SHULHQFH KDV
taught us that we cannot rely on market discipline to ensure 
safety and soundness.  Such statutory boundaries do not 
eliminate all discretion or freedom.  Within these outer 
boundaries, lenders and consumers are free to structure the 
terms of their mortgage products in order WRDFKLHYH&RQJUHVV·V
aim of an adequate supply of credit provided in a safe manner. 
 
 
                                                          
125. See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1674, 1679-­80 (proposed 
Jan. 9, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). 
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